wpa

A first-party WPA2/WPA3-Personal supplicant: the 4-way handshake.

When a station joins a protected network, the AP and the station run a four-message exchange that proves both know the pre-shared key and establishes the session keys, without ever sending the key. This crate is the station’s half of that exchange, in first-party no_std Rust over crypto.

Pure protocol, no radio

The supplicant is deliberately radio-blind. It consumes EAPOL-Key frames as bytes and produces response frames and derived key material as bytes — it never sends a frame or installs a key itself. That is what keeps it portable across every FlintOS target and fully testable on a host against a captured handshake: the same state machine that runs on the ESP32 blob radio runs unchanged over any other, because it knows about neither.

A radio backend drives it: hand each received EAPOL frame to the supplicant, send whatever response it returns, and install the keys it derives when it reports the handshake complete.

Scope

WPA2-Personal (PSK) with CCMP first — key descriptor version 2, HMAC-SHA1 MIC, AES-key-wrapped group key. WPA3-SAE and the older TKIP/version-1 paths are named where they would slot in rather than half-built, the same discipline crypto follows.

This crate is under construction; the modules below fill in as the handshake is built, each against its own test vectors.

Modules

• eapol — The EAPOL-Key frame: the wire format of the 4-way handshake.
• handshake — The 4-way handshake state machine.
• keydata — The key-data field: the station’s RSN IE, and the AP’s GTK.
• rsn — Parsing a network’s security from its RSN / WPA information element.